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Conflict of Laws: Choice of
Law in Criminal Cases
Robert A. Leflar*
Noting the development of "the new choice of law" in modern
civil litigation, the author demonstrates how this approach to conflicts
problems applies in criminal cases. After considering constitutional
limitations on choice of law in the criminal area, the author discusses
the development of the techniques formerly used. He points out that
statutes designed to govern choice of law in criminal cases are rare
and that attempts to extract answers from penal statutes are mislead-
ing. Having explained the traditional "territorial" test, the author
analyzes the fictions often used to avoid its results. He then investi-
gates the English background and its impact on decisions in the
United States. Finally, the author shows how the five fundamental
choice-influencing considerations that contemporary courts look to in
civil suits provide solutions to choice-of-law problems in criminal
cases as well.
I. INTRODUCTION
M AURICE S. CULP is recognized throughout the United States as
one of the little group of distinguished teachers in the field of
Conflict of Laws. His scholarly contributions on the subject have
been substantial. He has also taught Criminal Law and Procedure
for many years and has done distinguished work in that field of the
law as well. It seems fitting, therefore, that an article written in his
honor and in recognition of the excellence of his work should deal
with these two subjects as they come together when courts are faced
with the increasingly common and complex problems presented by
interstate and multistate criminal activity. Conflict of laws treatises
and casebooks usually omit material on choice of law in the criminal
law field almost altogether. They take up conflicts problems as
though they arose only in civil litigation. An unfortunate gap in con-
flicts history and theory is a result. Anglo-American conflicts law
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homa; Distinguished Professor and Dean Emeritus at the University of Ar-
kansas Law School. B.A., University of Arkansas, 1922; LL.B., Harvard Uni-
versity, 1927; SJ.D., 1932. Director of Appellate Judges Seminars at New
York University. Former Associate Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court.
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had many of its origins in criminal cases. Territorial principles and
the idea of sovereignty as basic to choice of law found early expres-
sion in criminal decisions,1 and it was from them that much of later
choice-of-law thinking, first in torts cases and then in other substan-
tive areas, developed. Well past the time of the first Restatement
of Conflict of Laws2 the notion of territoriality persisted (as it to
some extent still persists today) as the basic test for choice of law
in all sorts of cases. Yet the test was first firmly imbedded in the
criminal decisions.
It is not the purpose of this article to trace the history of territor-
ial theory. Modem conflicts learning, both academic and judicial,
has moved away from the idea of rights and obligations vested
permanently by automatic application of the law of the place where
some key act or event occurred in the course of a transaction. Terri-
torial contacts are still relevant, necessarily, but the old, supposedly
hard-and-fast, rules based upon preselected territorial contacts are in
most states no longer regarded as all-important. A variety of new
approaches, susceptible it is believed to a sort of ecumenical coor-
dination and combination which can be identified as "the new law
of choice of law,' 3 are being accepted today. These new approaches
(or this new approach) appeared first in contract 4 and torts5 cases,
but has now been pretty well extended across the choice-of-law board
in civil cases. The new Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws"
1. The argument would run in this fashion: Whatever occurs within
the territorial limits of one state is of no concern to another state.
If an offense is committed in New York that is not within the pur-
view of the state of California. New York is able to take care of
itself. It needs no assistance from California. It is not the business
of the state of California to punish a person who breaks the law of
New York. California is not the guardian of the safety of New
Yorkers. Any attempt on the part of California to punish offenses
committed in New York is an attempt to exercise sovereignty over
events in New York. No foreign state should be given that power.
An independent sovereignty can brook no control of its citizens by
a foreign sovereign, nor allow what occurs within its territorial bor-
ders to be punished by another.
Levitt, Jurisdiction over Crimes-Il, 16 J. Csm. L. & CUMNOLOGY 495, 509-
10 (1925).
2. rsTATEMENT OF CoNFLIcT OF IAws (1934).
3. See Leflar, The "New" Choice of Law, 21 AM. U.L. REv. 457 (1972).
4. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954); Haines v. Mid-
Century Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 2d 442, 177 N.W.2d 328 (1970). See Coyne, Con-
tracts, Conflicts, and Choice-Influencing Considerations, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 323.
5. Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Babcock v. Jack-
son, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). Cases cited
in note 71 infra.
6. RmSTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNFLIcT OF LAws (1971). Section 6 of
the Restatement, which sets forth general choice-of-law principles, is referred
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confers official blessing upon this development. It is submitted that
essentially the same development, and the same justifications for the
development, apply in the criminal law also.
II. LIMITATIONS UPON CHOICE OF LAW IN CRIMINAL CASES
It is of course true that there are limitations, especially state con-
stitutional ones, that apply peculiarly to criminal cases. Concerns
about sovereignty may in part underlie some of these limitations,
though concerns about protection of the human rights of accused per-
sons-the sort of protections that are assured by constitutional due
process of law clauses-probably are more in point. Most of the
state constitutions include Bill of Rights clauses to the effect that an
accused must be tried by an impartial jury "in the county where the
offense was committed" or "is alleged to have been committed," "in
the county or district of the offense," or "by an impartial jury of the
vicinage" or "a jury of the vicinity."' 7 Though these clauses are on
their face directed primarily to questions of jury fairness and venues
within the state, they at the same time operate as limitations on the
jurisdictional power of the state's courts to hear extrastate cases.
The limitations prescribed by them must be observed, but a consider-
able body of judicial interpretation has rendered them less restrictive
than they might have been.
A related limitation, not constitutionally grounded but generally
recognized, is that "[t]he Courts of no country [state] execute the
penal laws of another."9  The application of this exclusionary rule
to civil claims having some aspect of penality has in recent genera-
tions been much minimized,' 0 but its application in criminal cases
to as controlling the identification of "most significant relationships" in all the
choice-of-law sections throughout the Restatement. "And who can doubt the
ecumenicalism of the Second Restatement?" Peterson, Weighing Contacts in
Conflicts Cases: The Handmaiden Axiom, 9 DuQutsNE L. REv. 436, 441 n.30
(1971). See generally Reese, Peterson, Leflar, Sedler, Baade & Lowenfeld,
Symposium on the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, 72 COLuM. L.
REv. 219 (1972).
7. Fifteen phrasings of this state constitutional language are listed in
Levitt, Jurisdiction over Crimes, 16 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 316, 331-32
n.46 (1925). Few if any of them have been changed since Professor Levitt's
time. Cf. Commonwealth v. Simeone, 222 Pa. Super. 376, 294 A.2d 921
(1972), noted in 77 DIcK. L. REv. 561 (1973).
8. Williams v. Turner, 503 S.W.2d 901 (Ark. 1974); see Miller, Constitu-
tional Limitations on the Power of the Missouri Legislature to Provide for
Venue in Criminal Cases, 1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 35; Note, 25 HASriNGs L. 547
(1974).
9. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825) (Marshall, CJ.).
10. See Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental
(Vol. 25:44
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is as rigorous as ever. Justifications for the rule have been summar-
ized as follows:
(1) historical reasons based on the intensely local
character of early legal systems, including the fact of col-
lective responsibility of the community for acts done within
its borders and the notion of the trial body as a jury of
neighbors personally acquainted with the facts in the case;
(2) respect for the sovereign rights and pretensions of for-
eign states and nations, coupled with the idea that the dip-
lomatic processes of extradition and interstate rendition
would give adequate relief against absconding parties; (3)
procedural difficulties, such as . . . the traditional proce-
dure in criminal cases of action brought by the injured state
as a plaintiff; (4) local public policy opposing the type of
claim . . .; (5) . .. practical inconveniences, particu-
larly (a) the added expense to taxpayers of conducting
trials and enforcing sentences . . . coupled with possible
overcrowding of dockets by unnecessarily imported [prose-
cutions], (b) expense and hardship ,to the defendant from
having to appear with witnesses at a distance from the
place where the events in question occurred, (c) possibly
increased difficulty of reliable proof of facts at a distance
from the place of their occurrence, and (d) possible ignor-
ance and difficulty of proof of foreign law as such; (6)
American constitutional guaranties to criminal defendants
of the right to trial by jury in the vicinity of the offense."
Whatever the reasons, no American state entertains criminal prosecu-
tions brought by the authorities of another state. Even in prosecu-
tions brought under interstate compacts or reciprocal statutes giving
adjacent states concurrent jurisdiction over crimes committed on
boundary streams, the theory is that the forum state is enforcing its
own law, made applicable by mutual agreement to the entire area
of the boundary stream.12
One effect of this localization of prosecutions, almost but not
quite unique in conflicts law, is that the question of jurisdiction and
that of governing substantive law always receive the same answer.
The governing law is always that of the forum state, if the forum
court has jurisdiction. Judicial jurisdiction and legislative jurisdic-
Claims, 46 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1932); Comment, Extrastate Enforcement of
Penal Laws, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 187 (1957).
11. Leflar, supra note 10, at 201-02. In reference to item (2), as listed
above, cf. Collins, Traffic in the Traffickers: Extradition and the Controlled
Substances Import and Export Act of 1970, 83 YALE L.J. 706 (1974).
12. Padgett v. State, 151 Ark. 290, 236 S.W. 603 (1922); State v. Moyers,
155 Iowa 678, 136 N.W. 896 (1912); State v. Cunningham, 102 Miss. 237,
59 So. 76 (1912); State v. Holden, 46 N.J. 361, 217 A.2d 132 (1966).
19741
48 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tion are identical. In this respect criminal cases are different, theo-
retically at least, from civil suits. The difference lies in the "transi-
tory" (as distinguished from "local") character of most civil causes
of action, 13 because of which a cause of action that by vested-rights-
territorial theory came into existence under one state's law may be
sued upon in another state.
The point is that criminal claims are not "transitory." Perhaps
the only sort of civil suit that is comparable to criminal cases in this
respect is for divorce, an area in which it has traditionally been held,
almost without question, that the controlling grounds for divorce are
those prescribed by forum law, regardless of the law of the place
where the grounds for divorce occurred or where the spouses were
domiciled at the time they occurred.' 4 It may be that in theory di-
vorce suits, like criminal prosecutions, were non-transitory, main-
tainable quasi in rem at the domicile only, so that the applicability
in them of forum law only can be historically explained by the same
territorialistic justifications as are employed in criminal law. That,
however, is a speculation which, by reason of current changes in
American divorce law15 and mores, is rapidly becoming obsolete.
The Federal Constitution, by its due process clause, sets the same
outer limits on a state's power to apply its own law to extrastate facts
in criminal cases as are set for civil cases. A state may not, under
the clause, exercise legislative jurisdiction by applying its substantive
law to a set of facts which has no substantial connection with the
state. This limitation has been more fully developed by the United
States Supreme Court in civil than in criminal litigation, but the rule
is stated in general terms:
Where more than one state has sufficiently substantial con-
tact with the activity in question, the forum State, by analy-
sis of the interests possessed by the States involved, could
constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the law
of one or another state having such an interest in the multi-
state activity.16
13. See Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914).
14. Brickey v. Brickey, 205 Ark. 373, 168 S.W.2d 845 (1943); Torlonia
v. Torlonia, 108 Conn. 292, 142 A. 843 (1928); Stewart v. Stewart, 32 Idaho
180, 180 P. 165 (1919); Rose v. Rose, 132 Minn. 340, 156 N.W. 664 (1916).
15. "Nontransitory" is hardly a realistic description of divorce practice to-
day. Cf. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.
2d 86 (1965), which recognized what was essentially in personam jurisdiction
in a divorce case; D. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws, 34 U.
Cm. L. REv. 26 (1966).
16. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962). "Acts done outside
a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within
[Vol. 25:44
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The due process clause precludes unrestricted application of spatially
irrelevant law by a state court, to a set of facts.17 The full faith
and credit clause,' 8 the equal protection clause, 19 and possibly even
the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, 20
may buttress this result. But, as the leading case of Home Insurance
Co. v. Dick illustrates, 21 the comprehensiveness of the due process
requirement assures the result even in fact situations to which some
of the other clauses could not apply. Generally speaking, the geo-
graphical locations of acts, and of the effects of acts, have been the
tests of legislative jurisdiction, though the tests are today often ex-
pressed in terms of state interests affected by the geographically lo-
cated acts or effects. 22 Regardless of the language, the requirement
is that the acts, and the effects thereof, to which a particular state's
law is to be applied, must have some substantial connection with that
state.
One aspect of this requirement which must not be overlooked has
to do with proximate causation. It is obvious that an actor can be
the legal cause of an effect within a state as a consequence of conduct
outside the state. Firing a bullet in state X that kills a man in state
Y is an easy example. But what are the outer limits of legal causa-
tion under which an actor in X may constitutionally be subjected to
the law of Y when his acts in X had some causal relation to effects
felt in Y? Presumably the answer is afforded by the common law
of proximate causation, whatever that may be. The United States
it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present
at the effect . . ." Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911). The dis-
tricts in which federal criminal cases may be prosecuted is a matter governed
by specific constitutional provisions. U.S. CONST. art. M, § 2, cl. 3; amend.
VI.
17. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). This constitutional lim-
itation is supported by a long line of cases, and, while its exact scope has
shifted at times, the principle remains firm, from Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578 (1897), up through Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179
(1964), and to the present time. See Leflar, Constitutional Limits on Free
Choice of Law, 28 LAw & CONTEMp. PROBS. 706 (1963); Comment, States'
Rights in Conflict of Laws, 19 ARK. L. REv. 142 (1965).
18. See Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on
a State's Choice of Law, 44 IowA L. RaV. 449 (1959).
19. See B. Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Con-
flict of Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. Cr. L. Rv. 1 (1960).
20. See B. Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Con-
flict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323 (1960).
21. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
22. See B. Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Govern-
mental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 9 (1958).
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Supreme Court has dealt with the problem, in Young v. Masci.23
The facts were that D in State X lent his car to B to use for a few
days. B drove it across the nearby state line into Y, where he negli-
gently injured P. Suit was brought in state X. The Supreme Court's
holding was that there was sufficient causal relation between D's
lending in X and B's driving in nearby Y to permit liability to be
imposed on D under Y's bailor's liability law.24 The usual proximate
causation formula puts emphasis on probabilities, on whether D's act
creates an appreciable risk of the ultimate effect. This standard is
an inexact test for constitutional purposes, but no better one has been
established.
In addition to the geographical location of acts and their effects,
citizenship has always been recognized as a possibile basis, complying
with due process, for legislative jurisdiction. For this, national citi-
zenship is clearest, and there are authoritative cases in which an ac-
tor's citizenship has sustained imposition of sanctions, including crim-
inal ones, upon him by his nation.25 The cases are less clear when
the basis asserted for legislative jurisdiction over a noncitizen actor
for extranational acts is the citizenship of the actor's victim.26 It is
doubtful if due process is satisfied when the national forum's contacts
are that thin, but circumstances alter cases, and a firm negative is
impossible. A defendant actor's citizenship in a state of the United
States, too, has served to sustain state legislative jurisdiction over him
in a criminal case, when the act punished was done at a place where
no other state's law was operative (on the high seas). 27 Probably
forum state citizenship alone would be too little if the defendant
citizen's act were done in a sister state, so that the sister state's law
could be deemed to govern it. State citizenship (domicile) does suf-
23. 289 U.S. 253 (1933).
24. The result would have been different had B, after obtaining D's per-
mission to use the car within states X and Y, driven the car to state Z, 1000
miles away. See Scheer v. Rockne Motors Co., 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934).
25. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922); Steele v. Bulova Watch
Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952). Cf. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421
(1932) (judicial jurisdiction based upon national citizenship). See also Note,
Extraterritorial Application of Federal Antitrust Laws: Delimiting the Reach
of Substantive Law Under the Sherman Act, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1030 (1967);
13 H-Iv. INT'L L.J. 346 (1972) (extraterritorial reach of proposed federal
criminal code).
26. See Berge, Criminal Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle, 30
MicH. L. Rnv. 238, 266-67 (1931),
27. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941) (prohibited fishing off coastal
waters).
[Vol. 25:44
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fice to sustain state judicial jurisdiction,28 but the limits set by due
process (fair play and substantial justice) for state exercise of judi-
cial jurisdiction definitely do not coincide with those set for legislative
jurisdiction, even though the two have been moving closer together
in recent years.2 9
Regardless of what details satisfy the requirements, it is certain
that due process must be satisfied before any American court, state
or federal, may constitutionally apply its law to impose criminal (or
civil) sanctions upon any defendant for extrastate or extranational
activities. Due process does not allow a state to apply its substantive
law to a set of facts which involves no substantial contacts with that
state. The remaining question, and the one to which this comment
is principally directed, is: Assuming that it would not be unconstitu-
tional for a forum state to apply its criminal law to a given set of
facts having both in-state and out-of-state elements, when should it
proceed to do so? In other words, what should be the choice-of-law
tests, or approaches, to be employed by American courts in criminal
cases?
Il. TRADITIONAL CHOICE-OF-LAw TECHNIQUES
EMPLOYED IN CRIMINAL CASES
To start with, it is clear that if any state has enacted choice-of-
law statutes applicable to criminal cases, the statutes control. They
supersede whatever common law rules the state might otherwise have
laid down. But American choice-of-law statutes, on the whole, have
tended to be vague and ambiguous, if not worse, and have often re-
quired considerable judicial interpretation. 30 A few states have en-
acted fairly comprehensive laws on criminal jurisdiction, but most
states have not. California is one of the few. 31 Its statutory sections
overlap and repeat themselves, apparently for the purpose of making
sure that every possible situation is covered. They include these pro-
visions:
28. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). Cf. Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
29. See Leflar, The Converging Limits of State Jurisdictional Powers, 9
J. Pun. L. 282, 292 (1960).
30. See Danson, Territorially Limited Statutes and the Choice-of-Law
Process, 1 HARV. J. LEGIS. 115 (1964); Rotenberg, Extraterritorial Legislative
Jurisdiction and the State Criminal Law, 38 TEXAs L. REv. 762, 770 (1960);
Unger, Use and Abuse of Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 83 L.Q. REv. 427
(1967).
31. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 27777-95 (West 1970). A classified collection
and citation of the state statutes appear in Berge, supra note 26, at 249-59.
Very few of them have been changed since that article was written.
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The following persons are liable to punishment under
the laws of this state:
(1) All persons who commit, in whole or in part, any
crime within this state .... 3
When the commission of a public offense, commenced
without the State, is consummated within its boundaries by
a defendant, himself outside the State, through the inter-
vention of an inocent or guilty agent or any other means
proceeding directly from said defendant, he is liable to
punishment therefor in this State. .... 33
Whenever a person, with intent to commit a crime,
does any act within this state in execution or part execution
of such intent, which culminates in the commission of a
crime, either within or without this state, such person is
punishable for such crime in this state in the same manner
as if the same had been committed entirely within this
state.3 4
The Wisconsin statute,3 5 more succinct but possibly just as com-
prehensive, provides that:
A person is subject to prosecution and punishment un-
der the laws of this state if:
(a) He commits a crime, any of the constituent ele-
ments of which takes place in this state; or
(b) While out of this state, he aids and abets, conspires
with, or advises, incites, commands, or solicits another to
commit a crime in this state; or
(c) While out of this state, he does an act with intent
that it cause in this state a consequence set forth in a sec-
tion defining a crime; or
(d) While out of this state, he steals and subsequently
brings any of the stolen property into this state.
Statutes in other states more often deal only with specific crimes,
such as homicide. Thus, in addition to the common law rule, appli-
cable to shots fired across a state line, that a killing is punishable
by the law of the place of first harmful impact on the victim,36 stat-
utes have authorized prosecution and punishment also under the laws
of two other states-the state from which the shot was fired3 7 and
32. CAL. PENAL CODE § 27 (West 1970).
33. Id. § 778.
34. Id. § 778a.
35. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.03 (1958).
36. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912); State v. Hall, 114 N.C.
909, 19 S.E. 602 (1894); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 410 Pa. 160, 189 A.2d
255 (1963).
37. That would be the effect of the California and Wisconsin statutes
quoted above. See People v. Botkin, 132 Cal. 231, 64 P. 286 (1901).
[Vol. 25:44
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the state in which death occurred. 38 It can hardly be denied that
there are contacts with each of the three states sufficiently substantial
to satisfy the requirements of the due process clause. In fact, it
could sensibly be urged that, in any state which has no statutes such
as those just cited, and whose common law rules are not yet firmly
fixed, the courts should carefully consider the approaches used in
these statutes when they determine what their own common law is
to be. Possibly prosecution should be permitted at any one, though
at no more than one, of the three places. 39
A principal barrier to intelligent choice of law in criminal cases,
and in other types of cases as well, 40 is the idea that choice-of-law
rules applicable to statutory sanctions, such as those imposed by crim-
inal statutes, should be derived from the language of the statute itself.
On its face, this is a legitimate approach to the problem. However,
when a statute is directed at the elements of a particular crime and
is silent as to choice-of-law considerations, inquiry into legislative in-
38. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1105 (1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2
(1965) (covers both death in state and act in state causing death elsewhere);
MAss. GEN. IAws ANN. ch. 277, H9 61-62 (1968) (similar to Maine) (for
an application of this statute, see Commonwealth v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1
(1869)); MnN. STAT. ANN. H9 627.09-.10 (1947); N.M. STAT. § 40A-1-15
(1953) (similar to Maine); cf. Comment, Jurisdiction over Interstate Homi-
cides, 10 LA. L. Rv. 87 (1949).
39. Though this would appear to be the fair result, it should be noted that
the double jeopardy clause might not bar dual prosecutions by two states. Cf.
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 131-33 (1958), in which the Court upheld
successive convictions by federal and state governments. The Court reasoned
that each government, acting as a separate sovereign, was prosecuting a sep-
arate offense even though the offenses arose from the same evidence. Id. at
131-33. See also Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), which upheld
successive convictions by the state and federal governments.
The Court subsequently applied the fifth amendment's double jeopardy
clause to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969), but in Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 392 (1970), the
Court again reaffirmed the separate sovereignty rationales of Bartkus and
Abbate.
40. The early cases used this sort of statutory construction to resolve con-
flicts problems under the statute of frauds. Thus a section of the statute
worded "No action shall be brought" was deemed procedural, governed by
forum law since it spoke in terms of remedy, whereas a section worded "No
contract . .. shall be good unless. . . ," being worded substantively, was
deemed to be governed by the law governing the contract as such. Leroux
v. Brown, 12 C.B. 801, 138 Eng. Rep. 1119 (C.P. 1852); Houghtaling v. Ball,
20 Mo. 563 (1855). That approach is generally rejected today, there being
no reason to believe that the variant wordings of different sections of the stat-
ute of frauds were other than accidental. See Ehrenzweig, The Statute of
Frauds in the Conflict of Laws: The Basic Rule of Validation, 59 COLuM. L.
REV. 874 (1959).
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tent will almost certainly be misleading. This pseudo-interpretative
process gives a territorial meaning to words that are without terri-
torial meaning. It calls for analysis of a particular law's objectives
in territorial terms, perhaps by searching for the presence or absence
of state "governmental interests" or by tacitly applying other choice-
influencing considerations, as a means of discovering unexpressed
legislative intention concerning the territorial scope of the legislative
enactment. "Statutory construction" is thus made the tool for solving
conflicts problems. 41 This would not do much harm if relevant
choice-influencing considerations were always used as a basis for the
statutory construction, artificial though this would be. The trouble
is that many statutes include words which suggest some territorial
identification, and the statutory construction approach is apt to seize
on these words even when there is little or no reason for believing
that the legislators had choice of law in mind or that anyone else
would regard the word as significant, let alone decisive, if sound
choice-influencing considerations were to resolve the problem.
That is what has happened in many of the criminal law cases.
The word seized on is usually the active verb in the definition of the
crime. Thus, with the crime of bigamy, the active verb is "marry,"
referring to the act of marrying while already married to another.
By -territorial concepts -that crime can occur only at the place where
the bigamous marriage is performed,42 so that it can be prosecuted
and punished there and nowhere else. Correspondingly, the crime
of illegal cohabitation occurs where the parties "cohabit. ' 43 When
a statute makes it a crime to "sell," to "deliver," or to "offer" for
sale certain articles, for example to minors or intoxicated persons, the
crime is said to take place at the spot where the sale, delivery, or
offer occurs, 44 and not elsewhere. A criminal libel may be punished
only where the libelous matter is "published"; 45 "obtaining" property
by false pretenses, only where the things were obtained;46 "receiv-
41. See B. CuluuE, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONThM.
PROB. 754, 761-62 (1963); Hancock, Torts Problems in Conflict of Laws Re-
solved by Statutory Construction, 18 U. TORONTO L.J. 331 (1968).
42. Walls v. State, 32 Ark. 565 (1877); Green v. State, 232 Ind. 596, 115
N.E.2d 211 (1953); Wilson v. State, 16 Okla. Crim. 471, 184 P. 603 (1919);
Hopson v. State, 115 Tex. Crim. 260, 30 S.W.2d 311 (1930). But see Trial
of Earl Russell, [1901] A.C. 446.
43. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Commonwealth v.
Bradley, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 553 (1848); Finney v. State, 40 Tenn. 544
(1859).
44. Harper v. State, 91 Ark. 422, 121 S.W. 737 (1909).
45. Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304 (1825).
46. Sharpensteen v. State, 222 Ark. 519, 261 S.W.2d 537 (1953); Com-
monwealth v. Schmunk, 207 Pa. 544, 56 A. 1088 (1904).
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ing" deposits in an insolvent bank, only at the place where the de-
fendant "received" the money; 47 and the crime of wife or child
abandonment or desertion, only where the husband and father ac-
tually "abandons" or "deserts" his family by departing from them.48
In almost every definition of a crime, there is some active verb iden-
tifying the doing of an act which is a central feature of the crime,
though it may not be the only significant or even the major feature
of it. It is unfortunate for a state that has truly substantial contacts
and genuine concern with a particular crime to conclude that the
state's law cannot be applied to the crime merely because an active
verb points to an extrastate act which was only one step in an ex-
tended sequence of criminality. Statutory construction has its place
in conflicts law, as in all other areas of law, but it is too limited a
technique to serve all the sociolegal purposes that the choice-of-law
process needs to serve, whether in criminal cases, torts, contracts,
property, family law or any of the other fields of law in which choice-
of-law problems arise. Better answers than this technique affords
are available.
The traditional "territorial" test for applicability of a state's crim-
inal law has often not been as rigid as flat statements of it might
indicate. As with all the rest of the law of choice of law, gimmicks
were devised by facile courts to avoid unwanted limitations on appli-
cable law and jurisdiction. Technicalities in the law have always
bred new technicalities to ameliorate the rigidities and shortsighted-
nesses of the old ones.
One of the most elementary of the evasive gimmicks was used
in an early Georgia case, Simpson v. State.49 The defendant was
convicted of the crime of assault. He had stood on the South Caro-
lina side of the Savannah River and there fired a pistol at P who
was in a boat on the Georgia side of the river. His aim was bad and
he missed P, the bullet striking the water near P. His defense was
that he had done no act in Georgia nor caused any harmful impact
there. Affirming the conviction, Justice Lumpkin said:
-f a man in the State of South Carolina criminally fires
a ball into the State of Georgia, the law regards him as
accompanying the ball, and as being represented by it, up
to the point where it strikes ...
47. Wilkin v. State, 121 Ark. 219, 180 S.W. 512 (1915). See Common-
wealth v. Andrews, 2 Mass. 13 (1806) (receiving stolen property).
48. Cf. Commonwealth v. Lanoue, 326 Mass. 559, 95 N.E.2d 925 (1950)
("begetting" illegitimate child).
49. 92 Ga. 41, 17 S.E. 984 (1893).
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. . .He started across the river with his leaden mes-
senger, and was operating it up to the moment when it
ceased to move, and was, therefore, in a legal sense, af-
ter the ball crossed the state line, up to the moment that
it stopped, in Georgia. It is entirely immaterial that the
object for which he crossed the line failed of accomplish-
ment.50
The concept of constructive presence has also been employed to sus-
tain conviction when the defendant had been causally responsible for
results in a second state.51
The concept of continuing trespass was another fiction which at
times enabled courts to handle two-state cases more sensibly without
discarding territorial theory. The idea was that if goods were stolen
in a first state and -then brought by the thief into a second state, his
asportation of them into the second state was a continuing theft, so
that he could be held for larceny in the second state.52 The same
device has been used to sustain a conviction for obtaining property
by false pretenses and later bringing it into the prosecuting state.53
On the other hand, there are cases in which strict territorial
theory, unrelieved by mitigating fictions, has been of material aid to
defendants who were careful about their travel plans. 54  Not even
the concept of continuing trespass was always accepted.55 Some
courts applied the notion of territorial sovereignty strictly, others ap-
50. Id. at 43, 46, 17 S.E. at 985, 986.
51. E.g., Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912). But see the dis-
senting opinion of Holmes, J., id. at 386, objecting to the "fiction" of construc-
tive presence.
52. Worthington v. State, 58 Md. 403 (1882) (goods stolen in West Vir-
ginia, brought into Maryland); State v. Underwood, 49 Me. 181 (1858) (goods
stolen in Canada brought into Maine); Commonwealth v. Holden, 75 Mass.
(9 Gray) 7 (1857). See Commonwealth v. White, 358 Mass. 489, 265 N.E.2d
473 (1970) (auto stolen in Canada; same result, without reliance on fiction);
Annot., 156 A.L.R. 862 (1945).
53. State v. Williams, 35 Mo. 229 (1864); Bivens v. State, 6 Okla. Crim.
521, 120 Pac. 1033 (1912).
54. United States v. Davis, 25 F. Cas. 786 (No. 14,932) (C.C.D. Mass.
1837) (shooting across jurisdictional line); State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561
(1856) (out-of-state accessory); Commonwealth v. Apkins, 148 Ky. 207, 146
S.W. 431 (1912) (victim's death in state); State v. Carter, 27 NJ.L. 499
(1859) (death in state); State v. Cutshall, 110 N.C. 538, 15 S.E. 261 (1892)
(bigamous marriage elsewhere followed by cohabitation in state); State v.
Knight, 1 N.C. 44 (1799) (counterfeit bills made in Virginia, circulated in
North Carolina).
55. Strouther v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 789, 22 S.E. 852 (1895) (horse
stolen in West Virginia, brought into Virginia); Stanley v. State, 24 Ohio St.
166 (1873) (original theft in Canada).
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plied it loosely. Academic commentators often condemned it.56
It is only fair to add that some courts, at some times, did not
apply it at all. At least some commentators asserted that other
theories than the territorial one were being followed in some deci-
sions. Professor George, for example, in discussing international
cases, lists six "principles" 57 which are said to have had some follow-
ing:
1. The territorial principle.
2. The "floating territory" principle (applicable to ships
and aircraft, on which the "law of the flag" governs-
a kind of territoriality).
3. The protected interest principle (permitting punish-
ment of foreign acts which impair locally protected in-
terests).
4. Nationality of the offender (national citizenship giving
jurisdiction over the citizen's acts wherever commit-
ted).
5. Nationality of the victim (a theory harder to support,
as to extrastate acts by foreigners).
6. The "universality" principle (sometimes called "the
cosmopolitan theory," under which such evil crimes as
piracy on the high seas may be punished by any state
that catches the offender, anywhere).
Similarly, Professor Perkins lists four theories applicable to both in-
terstate and international facts:58 (1) territorial, (2) Roman (the
citizenship of the actor), (3) injured forum (essentially the same as
George's "protected interest"), and (4) cosmopolitan. In sum, al-
though courts were apt to be reluctant to deviate from the territorial
theory, if that approach proved too constricting, there was authority
available that looked to other factors in making the choice.
56. Berge, Criminal Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle, 30 MIcH. L.
REv. 238 (1931); Cook, The Application of the Criminal Law of a Country
to Acts Committed by Foreigners Outside the Jurisdiction, 40 W. VA. L.Q. 303
(1934); Levitt, Jurisdiction over Crimes (pts. 1 & 2), 16 J. CRiM. L. & CImr-
NOLOGY, 316, 495 (1925).
57. George, Extraterritorial Application of Penal Legislation, 64 MicH. L.
REV. 609, 613-14 (1966). There is some analysis of George's six "principles"
as applied to interstate situations in Empson, The Application of Criminal
Law to Acts Committed Outside the Jurisdiction, 6 AM. CuM. L.Q. 32 (1967).
58. Perkins, The Territorial Principle in Criminal Law, 22 HAStnNGs L.J.
1155 (1971). This list is the same as George's, except that "floating territory"
is not listed separately from the territorial theory but is included within it, and
"nationality of the victim" is omitted. Cf. Fitzgerald, The Territorial Princi-
ple in Penal Law: An Attempted Justification, 1 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 29
(1970).
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IV. CONTEMPORARY TRENDS IN CHOICE OF LAW
IN CRIMINAL CASES
Early English cases on the whole set the pattern for both the state
and federal decisions in the United States. They started out with
the territorial theory, then achieved variations from it, either by rein-
terpreting it more broadly or by developing other theories for special
fact situations. 59 It is -interesting that the Law Commission has re-
cently suggested that:
It should be enacted that where any act or omission or any
event constituting an element of an offence occurs in Eng-
land or Wales, that offence shall be deemed to have been
committed in England or Wales even if other elements of
the offence take place outside England or Wales. 60
Such an enactment would stretch the territorial theory almost to its
maximum breadth.
The English law is brought up to date by the decision of the
House of Lords in Regina v. Treacy.61 In England, on the Isle of
Wight, the defendant had posted a threatening letter to a woman in
Germany, demanding money and directing that the money be sent
to a London address. On receiving the letter the German woman
notified the police, who picked up the blackmailer at the London
mail drop. He was convicted of blackmail for making "an unwar-
ranted demand with menaces." The House of Lords by 34o-2 vote
affirmed the conviction. Two of the majority based their view rather
narrowly on an interpretation of the governing blackmail statute.
The other opinion, by Lord Diplock, was more thorough and far
more interesting. He agreed with his two brothers in the majority
on the interpretation of the words of the statute, but he went con-
siderably beyond that. He did not ask merely "Where was the crime
committed?" Instead, he said:
There is no rule of comity to prevent Parliament from
prohibiting under pain of punishment persons who are
present in the United Kingdom, and so owe local obedience
to our law, from doing physical acts in England, notwith-
standing that the consequences of those acts take effect
outside the United Kingdom. Indeed, where the prohib-
ited acts are of a kind calculated to cause harm to private
individuals it would savour of chauvinism rather than
59. Hall, "Territorial" Jurisdiction and the Criminal Law, 1972 CRM. L.
Rnv. (Eng.) 276; Williams, Venue and the Ambit of Criminal Law (pts. 1-3),
81 L.Q. Rnv. 276, 395, 518 (1965).
60. Hall, supra note 59, at 277.
61. 11971] AC. 537.
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comity to treat them as excusable merely on the ground
that the victim was not in the United Kingdom itself but
in some other state.
Nor, as the converse of this, can I see any reason in
comity to prevent Parliament from rendering liable to pun-
ishment, if they subsequently come to England, persons
who have done outside the United Kingdom physical acts
which have had harmful consequences upon victims in
England. . . .Comity gives no right to a state to insist that
any person may with impunity do physical acts in its own
territory which have harmful consequences to persons
within the territory of another state.6 2
In sum, English criminal law is applicable -if either the defendant's
act or its harmful consequences are located in England, unless Par-
liament declares otherwise. True, this is phrased in terms of Parlia-
ment's affirmative intent to that effect, which makes it a little like
the "statutory construction" approach to conflicts problems, 63 but the
interpretative process, if it be that, occurs in the complete absence
of any choice-of-law words in the statute. Rather, it derives from
an enlightened understanding of the concept of international comity,
which Lord Diplock assumes that Parliament shares with him. At
any rate, the common law rule proposed by Lord Diplock in Treacy
is almost, but not quite, as comprehensive as the statute previously
suggested by the Law Commission.64
American writers, too, have suggested bases for criminal jurisdic-
tion and applicability of the forum's substantive criminal law which
have gone beyond the traditional theories, and beyond the territorial
theory in particular. In recent years, following a popular approach
to general choice-of-law theory, most of these theories have been ex-
pressed in terms of governmental interests. 65 The "protected inter-
62. Id. at 561-62. The Diplock opinion is discussed approvingly in Regina
v. Baxter, [1972] 1 Q.B. 1, 11, 13 (C.A.) which involved the converse situa-
tion. An English conviction was affirmed against a defendant who mailed a
fraudulent claim from Northern Ireland to a prospective victim in England.
63. See text accompanying notes 40-48 supra.
64. Note 60 supra. The Commission's suggestion was broader in that it
would make English criminal law applicable if any "element of an offence oc-
curs in England." Cf. Hall, "Territorial" Turisdiction and the Criminal Law
1972 CRaM. L. Rav. (Eng.) 276, 284.
65. See B. Carrie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmen-
tal Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. REV. 9 (1958); B. Cur-
rie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 Dun L..
171; Kramer, Interests and Policy Clashes in Conflict of Laws, 13 RUTGERS
L. REv. 523 (1959). For illustration of how interest analysis may be applied
in a criminal case, see 6 STAN. L. Rav. 709 (1954), discussing State v. Tickle,
238 N.C. 206, 77 S.E.2d 632 (1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 938 (1954) (con-
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est" principle is one of those listed by Professor George.66 Another
commentator concludes that a state should be free to punish crimes
whenever an out-of-state actor should anticipate that his conduct or
resulting harm may affect the state's interests that are protected by
its criminal law.67 Section 1.03 of -the Model Penal Code of the
American Law Institute incorporates some of these ideas and would
permit a state to apply its law in a variety of situations when an ele-
ment of the offense (conduct or result) occurs in the state; in most
cases of out-of-state attempts or conspiracies to commit crimes in the
state or of in-state attempts, solicitations, or conspiracies to commit
out-of-state crimes, in certain cases of omissions to perform legal
duties imposed by the law of the state; and, finally, according to sub-
section (f), if "the offense is based on a statute of this State which
expressly prohibits conduct outside the State, when the conduct bears
a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of this State and the ac-
tor knows or should know that his conduct is likely to affect that in-
terest. '' 68 The Model Penal Code is not quite so broad as the 1670
Colony of New Plymouth law which declared that "whosoever having
comitted uncleanes in another Collonie and shall come hither and
have not satisfyed the law where the fact was comitted they shalbe
sent backe or heer punished according to the nature of the crime as
if the acte had bine done heer." 69 Both are framed as statutes, how-
ever, and the Model Penal Code's subsection (f) assumes the existence
of another statute, like the one in the Colony of New Plymouth, ex-
pressly making the out-of-state conduct punishable within the state.
Such state statutes, though, are rare.
Practically and realistically, the choice-of-law problem in criminal
cases is, as it is in civil cases, a common law problem. A comprehen-
sive statute such as section 1.03 of the Model Penal Code could be
enacted by any state, and if enacted would of course be binding on
the courts in the state. However, such criminal-conflicts enactments
are as uncommon in the states as are comparable enactments govern-
ing choice of law in torts, contracts, property, and other areas of civil
viction for nonsupport of North Carolina illegitimate child fathered by defend-
ant's sexual act in Virginia).
66. Text accompanying note 57 supra. For further references to local in-
terest as a proper basis for exercise of criminal jurisdiction, see George, supra
note 57, at 618, 627, 628, 631.
67. Rotenberg, Extraterritorial Legislative Jurisdiction and the State Crim-
inal Law, 38 TExAs L. Rnv. 763, 785 (1960).
68. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 1.03(1)(f) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
69. W. BRIGHAM, CHARTER AND LAws OF NEW PLYMouTH 162 (1836),
quoted in Rotenberg, supra note 67, at 770 n.38.
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litigation. It is even doubtful if it would be wise to enact such stat-
utes today, at a time when choice-of-law doctrine is unsettled and
the rules are in flux. If permanently operative conflicts statutes, civil
or criminal, are to be enacted, it would be best for legislative action
to await a time when sound principles are more generally agreed
upon. The fact is that in most American states today, as in England,
criminal choice-of-law statutes are helter-skelter and incomplete.
Where there are no governing statutes, the common law prevails.
In both the civil and criminal areas, Anglo-American conflicts law
had its beginnings in a theory of territoriality based on exaggerated
notions of sovereignty. On the civil side territorial theory is well
along on its way out. Currently recognizable choice-influencing con-
siderations are taking the place of old ideas about vested rights based
on abstractly identified key elements in multistate events. The crim-
inal law lags behind the civil in this move toward common sense and
rationality. It is time for criminal law to join the trend.
V. APPLICATION OF CHOICE-INFLUENCING CONSIDERATIONS
TO CRIMINAL CASES
For choice of law generally, the choice-influencing considerations
have been summarized under five major headings: 70
A. Predictability of results;
B. Maintenance of interstate and international order;
C. Simplification of the judicial task;
D. Advancement of the forum's governmental interests;
E. Application of the better rule of law.
State courts have not found it difficult to give effect to these consid-
erations -in deciding conflicts questions in civil litigation.71 Giving ef-
fect to them in criminal cases should, if anything, be easier, since
70. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICS LAW § 105, at 245 (1968). The
summarization and application of the choice-influencing considerations to spe-
cific sets of facts is explained more fully in Leflar, Choice-Influencing Con-
siderations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267 (1966); Leflar, Conflicts
Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALi.. L. Rnv. 1584
(1966). This group of considerations, except for E., appears in RErsATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CoNFLcr OF LAws § 6 (1971). This is the basic section that
underlies all the choice-of-law provisions in the Restatement.
71. Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Mitchell
v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222
A.2d 205 (1966); Pahmer v. Hertz Corp., 36 App. Div. 2d 252, 319 N.Y.S.2d
949 (1971); Brown v. Church of Holy Name of Jesus, 105 R.I. 322, 252 A.2d
176 (1969); Hunker v. Royal Indem. Co., 57 Wis. 2d 588, 204 N.W.2d 897
(1973); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).
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the case will not be heard unless it is proposed to apply the forum's
law to it. The question of jurisdiction and of choice of law combine
as one question-is the forum's substantive criminal law properly ap-
plicable to the facts? A preliminary part of the question is whether
federal due process requirements would be satisfied if forum law
were applied. If not, the question is answered. But if due process
would be satisfied, the common law part of the question remains.
That is when the choice-influencing considerations should be taken
into account.
The first of the considerations, predictability of results, is ob-
viously relevant. The applicability of a criminal law to a given act
must be so clear that a reasonable person may know that the act is
covered by the law. Vagueness and ambiguity in criminal laws in-
validate them.72 The old saw that the criminal law must be so clear
that "he who runs may read" really means something in this context.
The idea is that no one may be punished for an act unless he could
have known when he acted that his act violated some specific law.
That is why section 1.03 of the Model Penal Code includes, in addi-
tion to its provisions about acts in the state and results produced or
contemplated within the state, the requirement that "the actor knows
or should know that his conduct is likely to affect that [state's] in-
terest."'73 If a defendant could not reasonably have anticipated, in
the light of the foreseeable consequences of his conduct, that the
legitimate concerns of the prosecuting state might be affected by it,
this first consideration should bar the application of forum law and
stop the prosecution. But if interference with the state's interests
was reasonably foreseeable, and the state's law is otherwise valid, this
consideration is satisfied, and the court can pass on to the others.
The second of the choice-influencing considerations, which calls
for interstate and international orderliness in the law's administration,
is equally relevant. Respect for the interests of sister states and na-
tions, in their sovereign character, is the policy factor that has from
the beginning been assigned as the major justification for the territor-
ial theory.74 It is a real reason for a state's self-restraint in prosecut-
ing under its law crimes to which another state would affirmatively
72. This is the effect of the federal constitution's due process clause. Ash-
ton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1939). Many state decisions similarly condemn indefiniteness in criminal
law. E.g., State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403, 369 P.2d 365 (1962); People v. Munoz,
9 N.Y.2d 51, 172 N.E.2d 535, 211 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1961).
73. Note 68 supra.
74. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
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prefer to apply its own law, or its own non-law. This reason may
be more important in international75 than in interstate cases. A
somewhat contradictory aspect of the same consideration however,
is the common interest of nearly all states in stamping out crime.
Crimes that are planned and executed across state and national
boundaries can be especially frustrating to police authorities, and co-
operation between the authorities of different states is not only useful
in good criminal law administration but is regularly undertaken by
the police and prosecuting authorities of most civilized states. It will
often be true that the active prosecution by an interested state of a
crime many of whose elements occurred elsewhere will be in further-
ance of interstate and international order and will actually facilitate
the other-state concerns that are identified with state and national
sovereignty. This second choice-influencing consideration is decid-
edly pertinent, but it does not look automatically to jurisdictional ex-
clusion to the extent that early cases seemed to indicate. Interstate
cooperation rather than distrust and repugnance is appropriate today.
The third of the considerations-simplification of the judicial task
-has little bearing on criminal cases. The forum court will apply
the law with which it is most familiar, its own law, in any event.
Evidence will have to be brought in from outside the state, but if
it is an interstate crime, that will have to be done regardless of where
the case is tried. It will be about as easy to try it in one state as
in another, though if the facts are such that trial would be more con-
venient in one state than in another, this can be taken into account.
The alternative least troublesome to the courts would be to try the
case nowhere-a result reached too often in the past in dealing with
interstate crimes.
Advancement of the forum's governmental interests, the fourth
of the choice-influencing considerations, is very much in point. The
75. See, e.g., Berge, The Case of the S.S. Lotus, 26 MIcH. L. REV. 361
(1928); Brierly, The 'Lotus' Case, 44 L.Q. Rv. 154 (1928); Comment, A
Half Century of Jurisdictional Development: From Bananas to Watches, 7 MI-
AMi L.Q. 400 (1953). On the somewhat related problems presented by crimes
committed by United States servicemen in other countries, see Metzger & Mc-
Mahon, The Return of United States Servicemen for Offenses Committed
Overseas, 22 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 617 (1971); Note, Jurisdiction over Ex-
Servicemen for Crimes Committed Abroad: The Gap in the Law, 22 CASE
W. REs. L. Rv. 279 (1971). Another area in which confusion still prevails
is as to crimes committed on international air flights. See Lissitzyn, In-Flight
Crime and the United States Legislation, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 306 (1973). See
generally, M. BAssIouNi & V. NANDA, A TREMASE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIM-
NAL LAw (1973), reviewed, Murphy, 4 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POLICY 153
(1974).
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whole body of a state's criminal law exists for the express purpose
of protecting interests with which the state is vitally concerned,
whereas much of private law controls merely the interests of individ-
uals between whom the state does not take sides except to the extent
of affording them a fair system of law for the settlement of their dis-
putes. In the criminal area, any given state has a true governmental
interest in any conduct anywhere, in or out of the state, that has anti-
social effects and harmful impact upon interests which that state is
concerned with protecting. If a defendant's act produces an injury
to a state's protectible interests, the state has an incentive for prose-
cuting him. The incentive alone may not be an adequate justifica-
tion for prosecution, since the due process clause requires substantial
contacts, 6 possibly exceeding the sources of incentives, and other
choice-influencing considerations in addition to advancement of the
forum state's governmental interests have to be taken into account.
Nevertheless, this consideration will in many cases weigh heavily in
favor of a state's proceeding to exercise criminal jurisdiction.
The last of the five considerations, the court's preference for what
it regards as the better substantive law, is not likely to have much
influence in criminal cases. The principal pressure for local prosecu-
tion in multistate crime cases will be a fear that the defendant can-
not, or will not, be effectively prosecuted in the other states. More
often than not this fear will grow out of a suspicion that the other
states will not be much interested -in prosecuting him vigorously, or
will lack access to the evidence that would enable them to do so.
Occasionally the pressure will come from an aroused public sentiment
against the particular criminal or type of criminality. If the offensive
act would not be adequately punished under the laws of other states,
or would not be punished at all because of technical defenses avail-
able under the other states' laws, then a preference for the forum's
"better law" might become significant. As between the states of the
United States that would not often happen.
VI. CONCLUSION
If two-state and multistate criminal cases are to be dealt with in-
telligently on the basis of modem conflict of laws principles, and not
mechanically as they have been too often in the past, it must be rec-
ognized that the new law of choice of law is a combination of the
several approaches which various scholars have proposed in recent
76. See text accompanying notes 16-29 supra.
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years. 77 The listed choice-influencing considerations underlie this
new law, but courts sometimes apply the new law without mention-
ing the considerations as such. The considerations can stay in the
background, even when they constitute the ultimate explanation of
results reached. Regardless of the language used, however, it is time
to realize that determination of what law governs in a criminal case
is a true choice-of-law problem, just as it is in a torts or a contracts
or a property case. The choice-influencing considerations operate
somewhat differently in criminal cases, just as their operation in con-
tracts or property cases is different from that in torts cases. But they
are operative in all the newer civil choice-of-law decisions, including
some that purport to reach automatic results under the old mechan-
ical rules. To an increasing extent modern courts, believing in intel-
lectual honesty, are openly and explicitly analyzing choice-of-law
cases in terms of the real choice-influencing considerations. When
the considerations are not mentioned in the opinions, they will us-
ually have been taken into account, either tacitly or expressly, in the
judges' preopinion analyses.
77. Leflar, The "New" Choice of Law, 21 AM. U.L. REv. 457 (1972).
See notes 3-6 supra and accompanying text.
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